Cryptobench

wycheproof-rsa-pkcs1-decrypt-invalid-pkcs1-padding

RSA PKCS#1: Invalid pkcs1 padding

This is a test vector with an invalid PKCS #1 padding. Implementations must ensure that test vectors with different modifications cannot be distinguished from each other. For example it is a mistake if invalid paddings lead to distinguishable exceptions (RFC 8017 Section 7.2.2). A recommended test is to collect the exceptions thrown by all test vectors with the InvalidPkcs1Padding flag and check that these exceptions are all exactly identical.

REJECT

Your service should reject this one.

Stated as the outcome to assert against, so a suite compares with this rather than hardcoding a result and getting it backwards.

An implementation that has a distinguishable reaction to different types of invalid PKCS #1 paddings frequently makes it easier to perform padding oracle attacks. Demonstrated by 59 test vectors across 3 vector documents in Project Wycheproof.

Provenance

Kind
vulnerabilityA published weakness exists for this. Failing it is a known exploit path.
Source
wycheproof
Clause
RFC 8017 §7.2
CVE
none
Weakness
none
Produce this on the benchTake a token apart

Test keys only. Nothing here is a statement about any particular service: the expected outcome above is what an application ought to do, not evidence that yours does.

Reference

URL or embedded key?

Your app needs the public key to check a token. It can fetch it from a URL at runtime, or carry it as a file. Both are normal. The trade is always the same one: who controls rotation.

Fetch from the URLEmbed the key
RotationAutomatic on next fetchNeeds a redeploy
NetworkDepends on the URLNone
TrustWhatever the endpoint servesPinned to one key
SuitsA signer that rotates keysOffline, air-gapped, or pinned

Use the URL when the signer rotates its keys, which is what every identity provider does. That is why it became the norm, and it is usually a one-line config change.

Embed the key when you cannot make a network call while checking a token, or when you want your app pinned to one key so a compromised endpoint could not introduce another. Export the PEM from the Keysets tab.

One catch worth knowing: Spring Boot's public-key-location only loads RSA keys. An ES256 or EdDSA key needs a custom decoder, or the URL.